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What makes similar firms respond differently to the emergence of a new institutional 
logic? I draw on practice theory to study the differences between firms that are largely similar in 
the conventional macro-institutional differentiators such as position, structure and governance. 
To do so, I conducted a qualitative study inside two firms in the automobile industry in 
Jamshedpur, India and discuss that in conjunction with the cognitive (head) aspects of strategy 
making, the daily practices may (hands) provide a complimentary understanding. I find, 
surprisingly, that a machine can have an agentic role to play in a firm's response to a new 
institutional logic and this response could vary depending on the impact that a firm's materials 
have on its supply chain practices, organizational practices and the mindset of top management. 
Finally, my model of the centrality of materiality conceptualizes the inter-relatedness of the role 
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     INTRODUCTION 
 
The culture at [Investa] is one of hard-work and risk-taking. Industry 4.0 is an opportunity to 
leave our competition behind and grow exponentially. Better preparation will lead to smarter 
investments. 
-   President from Investa(pseudonym) 
[Novista’s] culture and pride is reflected in its dedicated work-force and loyal customer base. 
Industry 4.0 is an abstract concept that need not be looked at just yet. When the time is right, we 
will start to prepare. 
-Director from Novista(pseudonym) 
 
Worldwide enterprises have favored to conduct their manufacturing processes in countries that 
can provide cheap labor (often combined with relaxed political and legal practices) such as India. 
Such environments have enabled foreign enterprises to exploit both human and material 
resources for profitability.  At the same time, however, the same local conditions have provided 
substantial challenges to foreign firms as learning and accommodating local business practices 
were often difficult for them. Therefore, as an alternate approach, in order to promote domestic 
manufacturing and stay competitive, engineers in Germany have begun to use innovative 
technology to build a manufacturing supply chain that would need little to no labor. The 
competency of the internet, combined with advances in robotics and automation, provides a 
means, if and when achieved, for achieving competitive costs by a drastic reduction in manual 
labor costs. This is termed as Industry 4.0 (I4.0 hereafter). 
 The global emergence of the notion of I4.0 has created a new institutional logic in Indian 
manufacturing industries. Interestingly, some firms in India have noticed it and made aggressive 
strides towards making investments in I4.0 technologies. Others, on the other hand, have taken a 
more cautious approach toward I4.0 with more acute recognition of the value inherent to their 
geographical location. For instance, Jamshedpur in India is a city that was developed primarily 
for manufacturing needs. In addition to the country’s cheap labor, this city also offers the 
cheapest power supply in India, which adds further benefits to those that choose to manufacture 
in that location. Although local firms in this city are largely embedded in the same geographic 
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and historical conditions, they have shown heterogeneous responses to the emergence of the new 
institutional logic – I4.0, ranging from aggressive investing to cautious following. 
 My research question involves an examination of why similar firms embedded in the 
same industry and geographic context would respond differently to the emergence of a new 
institutional logic. In explaining the heterogeneity in firm responses to institutional complexity, 
the extant literature has identified several attributes such as an organization’s field position (e.g., 
central vs. peripheral), structure, ownership, governance and identity as factors that shape 
different organizational responses under institutional complexity: these factors frame how firms 
perceive and construct the repertoire of responses available to them (See Greenwood et al, 2011 
for a brief summary). Despite substantial advances in knowledge on heterogeneous 
organizational responses to institutional complexity, there still is a limited understanding of why 
firms, especially when they are similar along the aforementioned attributes, would show different 
responses to an emerging institutional logic. The purpose of my thesis research is to fill this gap 
in the literature. In particular, I point out that the conventional macro-institutional research seems 
to be limited in its explanation of why firms in similar positioning and structural arrangements 
react differently to the emergence of a new institutional logic. More specifically, I follow the 
recent critique on the institutional literature, which suggests that with its historical focus on the 
environment and macro-perspectives, the institutional literature thus far has not fully 
acknowledged the role of individual action of people in organizations (Becky, 2011; Barley and 
Kunda, 2001).  
Building on these new insights from the recent scholarly conversations, my research 
takes a more intimate observation of firms in similar field positioning and structural 
arrangements in order to provide a deeper understanding of micro-mechanisms that drive 
heterogeneous responses of firms toward a new institutional logic. This focus on micro-
mechanisms is closely aligned with the recent surge of institutional studies that take a more 
micro-perspective based on the observations of daily workings within an organization (e.g., 
Rindova et al, 2011; Kellogg, 2011; Vaara & Whittington, 2012). By conducting a close 
observation of institutional action, Schilke (2018), for instance, finds that strong organizational 
identification increases organizational decision-makers’ resistance to environmental pressure. 
The shifts of focus to micro-mechanisms in institutional research has provided scholars with a 
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fresh lens to look at organizations in a more holistic manner and thus has greatly enriched our 
understanding of how organizations interact with institutions (or vice versa).    
While extending this stream of institutional research on micro-mechanisms, I further 
point out that prior studies in this stream have predominantly relied on cognitive mechanisms 
that drive firm decisions such as framing, identity, and identification (Bechky, 2011; Powell & 
Bromley, 2015; Schilke, 2018). This places large emphasis on the cognitive aspect, i.e., what 
goes on inside the head of actors. Less emphasis is placed on the actual practices of those actors 
within an organization. To complement the cognitive-based research stream, I use the literature 
on “practice theories” as my theoretical guide for investigating why similar firms show 
heterogeneous responses to the emergence of the new institutional logic – I4.0. Practice theory 
has the distinct ability to link macro and micro practices and develop a dynamic understanding of 
structure and agency (Vaara & Whittington, 2012). This integrated understanding of strategy 
helps capture the hands of an organization and complements the literature that captures the 
brains of the organization. One manifestation of practice theories for organizational research is 
the culture-as-toolkit model (Swidler, 1986). The conceptualization of a firms’ resources as a 
“grab bag” provides a picture of the agentic use of resources, while embedded within the larger 
structural context. The flexible usage of resources as and when needed provides an 
understanding of practice that is equipped to explain how firms not only assemble resources in a 
manner that is advantageous but also deploy these resources strategically (Weber and 
Dacin,2011). This perspective allows for a broad range of enquiry about the daily routines and 
mundane practices and a deeper examination of what actually goes on within individual 
organizations.  
To examine these daily practices of firms, I conducted a qualitative study in two firms in 
the automotive manufacturing industry in Jamshedpur, India. Despite their various similarities, 
the initial sample of ten firms showed variation in their responses to I4.0. Since the primary 
motivation of this research was to build a theory based on the observation of micro-practices 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990), I chose two firms that have made contrasting investment decisions 
pertinent to I4.0. The firm with the maximum investment was given the pseudonym “Investa” 
and the firm with minimal investment was given the pseudonym “Novista”. Using primary 
qualitative data from observing the daily practices and semi-structured interviews, I confirm that 
both firms were similar not only in terms of their structure and field position but also in their 
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access to social, political and cultural resources (Rindova et al, 2011; Kellogg, 2011). Further, a 
striking finding was that Investa’s adoption of the Computer Numerical Control Machines 
(C.N.C. hereafter) in the past led to a series of changes and manifested as the primary reason 
why this firm has made aggressive investment decisions favorable to I4.0 whereas Novista has 
not. The mass implementation of the C.N.C. has an impact on Investa’s supply chain, 
organizational practices and mindset of top management in a manner that, in combination, re-
enforced and favored the attributes of risk-taking and innovation. Novista, on the other hand, did 
not invest in C.N.C. in the past and continued to follow its developmental path using a low-risk 
and low-cost approach.  
 Based on this observation, I suggest that a machine (C.N.C. in my case) can have an 
agentic role to play in shaping a firm’s responses to a new institutional logic. More specifically, 
my analysis using the qualitative data demonstrated the long-term impact that the machine had 
on the firm in terms of how the firm engages with a new institutional logic -- I.40.  
This finding makes some important contributions. First, it adds to the recent enquiries on micro-
institutional research by showcasing that material artifacts may have centrality to an 
organization’s strategy. Second, it shows that macro-institutional literature may not have fully 
addressed the reasons behind heterogeneous responses of firms to an institutional logic under 
complex institutional conditions, and a practice lens in this regard provides a useful basis for 
deeper understanding. In this research, I discover the agentic role of the machine on 
organizational strategy and call for more research that elaborates the enabling or constraining 
impact that strategy has on the material. This would enable an understanding of both the material 
constitution of the social and the social constitution of the material (Orlikowski, 2005). The role 
of materiality in this context and its effect on the daily practices of a firm suggests that research 
in practice theory needs to acknowledge the role of materiality in organizational strategy. The 




As is customary with inductive, grounded approaches to theory building (Suddaby, 2006), I 
developed a preliminary understanding of management literature that dealt with firm responses 
to institutional complexity. Since this literature seemed to be unable to explain the varying 
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responses of the firms in my sample, I draw on the knowledge about the practice lens. Within 
this literature, the culture-as-toolkit (Swidler, 1986) lens proved to be useful as it can facilitate 
the field observation on the daily practices of the chosen firms. 
 
Organizational Responses to Institutional Complexity 
The literature on institutional complexity has evolved to embrace the notion of institutional 
logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991). Organizations are faced with multiple, often competing 
demands and must make decisions based on the limited information they possess. (Lounsbury, 
2001; Pache & Santos, 2010). In the current study, my primary focus is on understanding how an 
organization responds to institutional complexity resulting from the emergence of a new logic. In 
the early institutional literature, there were two contrasting views with regard to how 
organizations respond to a new institutional logic: firms may have agency, and an increase in 
ambiguity increases the extent of discretion (Goodrick & Salancik, 1996). Or, firms may not 
have agency and the institutional environment and isomorphic aspirations might dictate their 
actions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The literature has advanced significantly, and more recent 
studies have found positioning, structure, governance and identity as the primary differentiators 
between firms that explain heterogeneous organizational responses under institutional 
complexity. These factors are reviewed below. 
Positioning 
Organizations are influenced by their relative positions in the institutional fields. Institutions, in 
this sense, belong to either central or peripheral locations and this impacts their responses to 
complexity (Leblebici et al, 1991). Greenwood et al (2011) suggest that central positioning, 
measured in terms of size and status, is a double-edged sword. In contrast to its economic 
advantages, the centrality of an organization leads to a reduced flexibility, resulting from deep 
embeddedness into the norms of the institutional environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The 
peripheral organizations, on the other hand, are not so restricted in the ability to react either 
favorable or against the emerging phenomenon of complexity. In fact, they could be ‘insensitive 
to the newly emerging complexity.” (Greenwood et al, pg. 342). Lying at the periphery of the 
corresponding institutional field, fringe organizations tend to allow for deviation from 
established practices and norms. Due to the nature of their reduced connectivity to their more 
institutionalized counterparts, these organizations are less aware of the institutional complexity 
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that surrounds them. (Davis, 1991; Westphal et al, 1997) and are likely to favor radical new 
practices (Leblebici, 1991). 
Structure  
Organizational communities “quite likely differ in their awareness of and receptivity to 
institutional pressures” (Delmas & Toffel, 2008:1032; Greenwood et al, 2011). The presence of 
multiple communities due to a large number of layers in the organization may result in the 
formation of multiple sets of meanings. In addition, the varied interpretations of meanings 
attached to complexity could lead to an increase in resistance if an organization has a more 
complicated structure (Leonardi, 2011).  The complexity could also affect the repertoire of 
responses available, thereby influencing the responses of the organizations. (Swidler, 1986; 
Greenwood et al, 2011).  Hence, organizational structure matters in not only “shaping how 
organizations experience complexity” but also in “determining the repertoire of responses 
available.” (Greenwood et al, pg. 344). 
Governance and Ownership 
Members of the organization that are in powerful positions tend to dictate which logic the 
organization engages with. Conditions of ambiguity result in interpretations of complexity in a 
manner that is influenced by preferences. (Miller et al, 2010). Family firms are slightly different 
in that certain logics are prioritized over other ones, due to the embedded nature of firms owned 
and managed by members of a family. Community norms, in such cases, are usually prioritized 
(Greenwood et al, 2011). Therefore, it follows that the composition of ownership plays a 
significant role in determining how receptive an organization is to a particular logic, especially 
during times of competing and complicated logics.  
Identity 
While the above mentioned categories (ownership, structure and positioning) have been studied 
extensively, organizational identity has only been recently recognized as a potential filter for 
organizational response to complexity (Greenwood et al, 2011). One advantage of picking this 
filter is that researchers can examine responses both at the institutional level and at the level of 
the organization. At the institutional level, identity is important since it provides firms with a 
sense of belonging. A new food business owner may, for example, choose to operate as a 
restaurant and not a café and this would allow and restrict certain actions. At the firm level, 
identity may shape which repertoire of responses are developed by the firm (Sharma, 2000).   
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An examination of organizational identity has brought in more micro-aspects of organizational 
research such as aspirations, beliefs and values and provides an alternative lens by which 
organizational responses may be examined. Here, the emphasis is placed on the cognitive aspects 
of individuals and managers (Bechky, 2011; Powell & Bromley, 2015; Schilke, 2018). Micro-
institutional research on identity has provided rich and novel insights into some of the reasons 
behind the contrasting decisions of firms. Especially in the case of family firms, where the 
influence of the founder is high, identity plays an important role in determining the actions that a 
firm takes (Miller & Miller, 1983). This research enhances our understandings of the causal 
mechanisms between institutional complexity and organizational responses.  
Despite the notable advances in knowledge development, the current literature has put a 
greater emphasis on the cognitive aspect and less on the actual practices of members of an 
organization. Consequently, while identity may describe part of the reason why firms respond 
differently to the emergence of a new logic, stating it as the primary differentiator may provide 
an incomplete picture of the comprehensive reasons behind the responses. In this respect, the 
practice perspective can offer a complementary hand to further the knowledge developed thus 
far. Since there may be a discrepancy in what goes on in someone’s head and the actions that are 
performed, theories on practice may also be used to examine whether the actions of actors’ 
complement or contrast their cognitive beliefs. It may help bridge the gap not only between 
conscious and subconscious but also between agency and structure. For these reasons, I 
investigate why two largely similar firms, responding to the same institutional complexity, 
engage in radically different practices. In order to facilitate a research direction that appreciates 
the role of identity and adds to its missing components, I utilize the practice theory literature in a 
complimentary manner to previous research. 
 
Practice Theory- Strategy in Action 
Practices are ‘the accepted way of doing things, embodied and materially mediated, that are 
shared between actors and routinized over time” (Vaara & Whittington, 2012: pg 2). Practice 
theories highlight the co-constitutive aspect of structure and action i.e. social structures emerge 
from the situation action they also condition (Lounsbury & Beckman, 2015). This understanding 
provides a more inter-related and dynamic concept for management scholars. It allows for a 
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reconceptualization of strategy not as something that is purely deterministic or agentic but as 
something that actors do (Whittington, 2006). 
Practice theory stems from the debate between structure and agency, not only in 
management science but also in the entirety of social sciences. Until the 1990’s, the predominant 
school of thinking looked at the structural embeddedness of firms in their environment 
(Granovetter, 1985). Researchers that applied this framework to organizational studies explained 
that the environment exerted pressure on actors and this pressure influences their actions. 
Organizations adopted practices that were institutionalized in society and did so in an attempt to 
increase their legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). They had goals that cater more to their 
attempt at being legitimate than internal functioning. Clearly, the prevalence of terms such as 
isomorphism and determinism reflected an insignificant role of agency. In the 1990’s and early 
2000’s, as a response to overly deterministic studies, scholars emphasized the role of agents and 
discussed that actors make decisions from their own discretion and power (Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2005; Hardy & Maguire, 2008; Battilana & Roxenbaum, 2008). Providing actors with 
a role that exceeded simply conforming to field-level commands, these scholars found that 
agents could help initiate structural change (Colomy & Rhodes, 1994). Theories of institutional 
entrepreneurship painted a picture of intrepidity and suggested that even single actors could play 
a role in shaping institutions (Eisenhardt 1980, DiMaggio 1988). This was a departure from the 
literature that favored stasis. (Battilana et al, 2009, Holm, 1995). Soon enough, however, 
research in this field was criticized for heroic accounts of actors.  
 One of the recent manifestations of this longstanding debate between structure and 
agency has been the emergence of practice theory. Reconciling the differences between two 
opposing perspectives, scholars that subscribe to this theory suggest that in order to better 
understand the actions of actors, observations of the daily, mundane practices need to be made 
(Swidler, 1986). Two sociologists that were influential in this stream of knowledge are Pierre 
Felix Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens. Habitus, one of Bourdieu’s most influential concepts, 
refers to the deeply engrained habits, skills and dispositions that we possess as a result of our 
experiences. Just as a golf player knows how and where he has hit the ball without even looking 
at where the ball went, we all possess a certain intuitive skill that guides our actions in daily life. 
And this intuitive skill is a social process and neither the result of free-will nor determined by 
structures (Bourdieu 1984: 170, Navarro, 2006). He suggested that practices and structures are 
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shaped unconsciously and without any intentional pursuit of coherence. Giddens’s theory of 
structuration (Giddens, 1983) also examined this duality of individual and social forces. 
Although actors are not entirely free to choose their own deeds, they are the makers of the social 
structure. They can, by virtue of this agency, create institutional change. This perspective 
acknowledges that while practices are embedded in structure (high class people act differently 
from lower class people), there is an agency component that allows actors to act based on their 
discretion.  
In the last two decades, organizations and management scholars have increasingly picked 
this lens. In strategy literature, for instance, this practice perspective has been widely applied 
with the specific keyword, strategy-as-practice (Whittington 2006; Vaara and Whittington 2012; 
Jarzabkowski and Spee, 2009) as well as in organization theory literature under the notion of 
institutional work (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006 ; Zietsma and Lawrence. 2010). The SAP 
approach in particular moves the debate beyond either structure or agency and encapsulates 
practitioners (actors that perform the strategic actions), practices (“the social, symbolic and 
material tools “) and praxis (the flow of activity that helps enact strategy) (Jarzabowski & Spee, 
2009: 70; Lounsbury Beckman, 2015). This shows the nested nature of structure, agency and the 
surrounding social environment and together, these three facets of the approach show that actors 
are part of this broader social sphere and engage in activity. (Whittington, 2006) This inter-
relatedness forms a central part of this recent re-conceptualization of strategy, is in its nascent 
stage, and needs more theoretical and empirical work. Lawrence and Suddaby (2006), credited 
with the notion of institutional work, also shift the focus away from the ‘iron cage’ of structure to 
purposeful actions by actors that are aimed at creating and changing institutions. Zietsma and 
Lawrence (2010) use longitudinal analysis to show how agents can create change to the 
institutions in a field that they themselves are subject to. These have all provided valuable 
insights into the consequences of everyday action in organizational strategy and in conjunction 
with micro-institutional research, can provide a compelling direction for strategy scholars.  
Research on micro-institutional work focus on elements of cognition, aspirations, beliefs 
and values and seems more complete once they are followed up by ‘habits, skills and styles’ that 
allow actors to convert them into practice. (Swidler, 1986). There are practical examples of a 
preferred ideology not working out as intended all around us. Take technology implementation 
for example: while the intention behind implementing a technology in a workplace may be noble 
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and well thought out, the actual practice of implementation and usage by actors on the shop-floor 
may be very different from the prescription handed out in a manual. Since there seems to be the 
possibility that, in some cases what is intended and what is executed may not be the same, it is 
important to incorporate ways to appreciate the actual practice in theory. Hence, a combination 
of practice theory and research on micro-institutional work seems adequate to examine the 
strategic decisions of managers. One theoretical perspective that lies within the broader concept 
of practice theory is Ann Swidler’s ‘culture-as toolkit’ model, which is discussed below.  
Culture-as-toolkit.  Swidler’s concept provides an interesting lens to view a firm’s 
resources and practices. In her groundbreaking paper, she contested the existing notion that 
members of the poor community did not see the value in education. Using case-study method, 
she found that the members did, in fact, recognize the value but did not possess the “repertoire” 
of actions that facilitates action upon the recognition (Swidler, 2006). She suggested that a 
repertoire consisted of a grab-bag of resources that actors could choose from. This flexible 
conceptualization of strategy, within the broader scope of practice theory, means that actors have 
the agency to enact their practices, using their resources, in a flexible manner. This model was 
soon used widely by researchers and showcased its applicability at the organizational level. 
Lounsbury (2001), for example, showed that university students used tactics employed by the 
National Recycling Coalition to encourage actors to reuse materials, thereby promoting recycling 
practices on their campus. More recently, Giorgi et al. (2015: pg 21) presented a model that 
recommends that whilst values are deterministic, during times of environmental change, an 
organization “may need to mix and match from different toolkits and repertoires to make sense 
of its identity or update its business model” (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000).  This model promotes the 
idea that neither values nor toolkits have greater inherent values and are, instead, having an 
effect on each other and as a combined result, resulting in resource commitments and 
management decisions. It is more holistic and captures a more nuanced understanding of strategy 
which is intertwined in both the cognitive and practice aspects. Greater breath in the cognitive 
aspects combined with a more diverse toolkit of resources could provide an organization with 
greater horizons of possibility (Giorgi et al, 2015) due to possessing of a wide array of 
repertoires of action (Small et al,2010). This combination may have a role to play in the strategic 





Empirical Context: Automotive Component Manufacturing Industry in Jamshedpur, India 
The automotive industry in Jamshedpur provides a unique setting for researchers, given the various 
similarities across the firms that operate in the area. Jamshedpur, also called Tatanagar, is named 
after the founder of the global conglomerate Tata Group, Jamsetji Nusserwanji Tata. The city was 
built by the Tata Group in 1919 to facilitate the manufacturing opportunities that resulted from 
India’s Industrial Revolution in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Easy access to ports and 
availability of cheap labor were identified as important advantages of the geographical region of 
Jharkhand (then still known as Bihar). The automotive wing of the Tata Group, Tata Motors, was 
founded in Jamshedpur in 1945 and led to the birth of several other small firms in the automotive 
parts manufacturing industry. These firms benefited from the outsourcing opportunities that came 
from Tata Motors’ manufacturing requirements and became bigger players over time.  
The firms in this study, Investa and Novista, belong to the group of firms that were founded 
in the late 1990’s as a result of favorable economic policies by the government that promoted 
entrepreneurship. These family-firms, founded in 1996, enjoyed success over time and at the time 
of the study, had similar positioning and structure (Greenwood et al, 2011). They are also similar 
in the products they make and the customers they serve, including Tata Motors. Despite these 
various similarities, their contrasting decisions with respect to investing in innovative technologies 
related to I4.0 provides a research setting worthy of deeper examination. 
 The primary activity they are involved with is called “machining”. The process of 
machining refers to the removal of unwanted raw material from a work piece to produce the desired 
shape. Cutting tools are used to perform these removals and technologies related to this process 
have evolved over time. Developed nations such as Germany and Japan have developed and 
invested in these technologies to offset the high costs of human labor. However, in India, where 
the availability of cheap labor is plentiful, the adoption of these technologies has not been uniform. 
This has caused a divide in the industry, where some firms invest heavily but others do not. During 
the time of the study, Investa was engaging heavily with I4.0 technologies whereas Novista was 
maintaining its manual manufacturing processes.  
I4.0 is a new concept for the manufacturing process. This concept incorporates the 
advantages of automated machines that are able to convey data to other automated machines using 
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the internet. This potential ability of a manufacturing process to operate without the need for 
human assistance has generated considerable interest and uncertainty. Originated in Germany, as 
an attempt to compete with low-cost markets such as China and India, I4.0 has taken on a number 
of different names such as “High Tech Strategy” in The United States and “La Nouvelle France 
Industrielle” in France. However, the high costs related with investing in technology that is in its 
early stages of development, coupled with cheap labor prices has caused irregular adoption 
patterns among firms in India . The abstractness of this concept and the resulting ambiguity causes 
challenges in its interpretation and resulting investment decision-making. This variety of different 
investment decisions can have a significant long term impact on the Indian economy, given that 
16.75% of the country’s GDP comes from the manufacturing sector (CII, 2011). Despite their 
various similarities and observed difference related to I4.0, both firms are successful and provided 
a compelling empirical setting to examine why, in times of uncertainty, similar firms make 
contrasting strategic decisions. 
 
Data Collection 
Grounded theory (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Glaser, 1978) was chosen as the qualitative 
methodology. Following Gersick (1988) and Pettigrew (1988), I followed a deliberate, theoretical 
sampling plan (Eisenhardt, 1989). This sampling selection was done purely on the basis of free 
access to the production sites and an agreement with the top managers that allowed for the 
collection of qualitative data, attendance in weekly board meetings and one-on-one semi-
structured interviews with top management. This access was promoted by the fact that I grew up 
in the city of Jamshedpur and had indirect ties with members of the automotive industry. The 
sampling did not affect the results obtained in the study, since the primary purpose of this inductive 
research was to look at the phenomenon and produce theory. Generalizability was not of concern 
at this stage. For the purposes of the rest of the study, we will refer to the firm with no investment 
as Firm Novista (pseudonym) and the firm with some investment as Firm Investa (pseudonym). 
The cases selected were two extremes of investment since this allowed for transparent observation 
of the phenomenon of interest. 
I use primary data from qualitative fieldwork comprised of immersion into daily routines, 
semi-structured interviews and attendance at board meetings. To collect data, I traveled to 
Jamshedpur, India in December 2018 to do a pre-study analysis of the firms in the automotive 
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component manufacturing industry. The directors of ten firms were interviewed in a casual manner 
and asked about their firm’s investments related to I4.0 technologies. This represented a good 
sample of firms out of the 45 firms in Jamshedpur that engaged in auto-component manufacturing. 
Based on interview data, it was found that 5 firms had no investment, 4 firms had some investment 
and 1 firm had a lot of investment. To assist with building theory about similar firms and their 
contrasting investment decisions, one firm with minimal investment and the firm with maximum 
investment were chosen.  
One of the challenges identified early on was information-processing bias and in order to 
counter this, multiple sources of data were considered. Following Eisenhardt (1989), interviews, 
observations, archival data and qualitative data were combined to provide triangulation and 
stronger substantiation. To compare and contrast the micro-practices of the firms, the data was 
used to create their cultural repertoires. In order to do so, the following sources of data were used: 
1. Qualitative data during field observations; 2. Interviews with Top Managers 
 
Qualitative data during field observations. In order to better understand the daily 
routines and practices of the firms, I spent three weeks with the firms, observing their daily 
practices and interacting with the workers on the shop-floor. I did this to better understand their 
cultural repertoire and develop deeper knowledge about the activities of the firm. The ability to 
access the sites without restriction meant that I could make observations at different times of the 
day and week. This provided confidence in the emerging data since it was supported by multiple 
instances of occurrence. There were also some very interesting single occurrences that provided 
invaluable data on the firm's responses to internal and external changes. Some of these included 
the external auditing process, the hiring and training of new employees, the installation of new 
equipment and both firms’ response to an industry downturn. 
At the end of each day of data collection, the notes taken would be transferred to a master 
notebook in an organized manner and all data collected was included at this stage. In the same 
page as the notes, a column was built to pose questions for future enquiry. This served as a 
reminder about the research question: why do similar firms respond differently to the emergence 
of a new institutional logic? The abundance of data available was challenging to streamline and 
this daily practice ensured the accountability to the research objectives and an iterative process 
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that provided rich, first hand data about the daily practices of the firms. The data collected was 
textual and proved to be the primary source of knowledge. 
 
 Interviews with Top Managers.  The top management at both firms comprised of 
members in the founding family. At Investa, the father and son interviewees were the chairman 
and managing director respectively. At Novista, the father and son were the managing director and 
executive director respectively. They are referred to by their work designation since all of them 
requested for anonymity. The interviews were conducted at the conference rooms of the firms and 
were semi-structured. As a qualitative researcher, I wanted to have an open conversation about 
various topics related to the firm since that was better suited to receiving atypical answers to 
interview questions. The challenge was to go beyond the initial formality surrounding interviews 
and facilitate a discussion that would provide insight into the mindset of the founder, the historical 
trajectory of the firm related to investing and the plans for the future since these were not available 
in the data collected during the qualitative fieldwork. The aim was to collect data that would help 
paint a picture of the orientation of the firm in the eyes of their founders, since the decision-making 
power of the founders in family-based firms is often very high.  
The interview was audio-recorded and transcribed into verbatim data. To capture more 
data, I took additional notes as and when I could, especially during lengthy answers. There were 
some challenges that were faced during this process since the meetings were sometimes interrupted 
by members of the staff or noise from the operations in an around the meeting room. In such 
situations, I transcribed the data to the best of my ability and marked it as an unsure line of data 
during the data analysis. For the purposes of this study, I did not use the data in those lines which 
may have resulted in the loss of some valuable data that could have provided additional insight. 
Permission for the interviews was granted on the back of an email requesting participation 
and the terms and conditions were explained before the start of the interview. The managers were 
informed that the interview would be recorded and transcribed and they had the option to opt out 
of the interview at any stage. Once the interview was completed and data analysis began in March, 
2019, the data could not be revoked for a period of 5 years. At the end of this period, the files 
would be destroyed. The process went smoothly for both firms and their managers and no such 
measures had to be taken. I informed them that a copy of the result would be shared with them 
upon completion so that they could benefit from insights produces during the course of this study. 
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Data Analysis 
In investigating the reasons why two firms, similar in structure and positioning, made different 
decisions regarding their recent investments in innovative technology, my initial analysis was 
guided by the practice theory perspective in general, and the culture as toolkit perspective, in 
particular. The primary source of data was field-notes collected during multiple trips to 
Jamshedpur, India and the instruments used were qualitative notes taken during shop-floor 
observations and semi-structured interviews. The two firms were studied in parallel and in contrast 
and hence, the analytical method can be described as an qualitative cross-comparison case study. 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). The examination was grounded in theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) and focused 
on the daily mundane practice and rituals of actors and their interpretation. It was, in addition, 
guided by and adds to previous literature that looked at firm responses to institutional complexity. 
(Greenwood et al, 2011). 
The data were analyzed in stages. During the time between the first (interviews with top 
management of the sample of 10 firms) and second trip (observations and interviews at Investa 
and Novista), I identified the similarity between the firms and pondered reasons why they would 
react so differently. While this sample of 10 firms was small, it was adequate to notice a variety 
of responses to the newly emerging logic of I4.0. Since the variation in investment decisions in the 
sample of firms was clear, in order to go deeper into the field in the role of a qualitative researcher, 
I decided that it would be best to choose two firms out of the sample. Since the idea was to 
understand the reasons behind why similar firms make different investment decisions, I chose the 
firm with the maximum investment (Investa) and the firm with the minimum investment (Novista). 
After the second visit comprising qualitative fieldwork, I created a case-archive and a description 
of data from both firms, following the prescriptions of case-based research (Yin, 1998). I 
established a timeline of the main similarities and differences in their strategy and the historical, 
social and organizational contexts within which the changes took place (Harrison & Corley, 2011). 
It also served to reinforce the earlier reported similarities of Investa and Novista in terms of 
positioning, structure and governance. 2006 was identified as the initial point of the change process 
since the initial investments in innovative technology were made by Firm Investa. After identifying 
this inflection point, I mapped out a brief roadmap of the path that the study would take henceforth. 
This whole process of analysis was facilitated by intensive discussions with my thesis supervisor 
and this process provided confidence that the interpretations were not biased. 
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Next, I compared and contrasted the cultural repertoire of the two firms: the primary aim 
of this qualitative work. Following recent work on the analysis of the cultural repertoire (Weber, 
2005), changes in the toolkit between 1996 (founding year for both firms) and 2019(year of data 
collection) were observed. The text from qualitative data was coded using line-by-line coding 
(Charmaz, 2005). This process was beneficial in reducing the large volume of textual data into 
comprehensible pieces. Next, direct quotes from the interviews were classified into various 
categories, to be used as supplemental data to the notes from the field. Using multiple sources of 
data provided stronger belief in the emerging findings. During this final process, there was an 
ongoing discussion between my supervisor and me. This back-and-forth helped reduce 
information bias and provided a more neutral understanding of the data collected. This process 
was important since immersing in the field in the role of a qualitative researcher might result in 
bias, leading to the formation of less convincing results and resulting theory. 
FINDINGS 
I begin by comparing the cultural repertoire of the two firms and display their various 
similarities. I then examine the differences in their repertoire and show that Investa’s 
characteristics of risk-taking and growth orientation facilitated the investments in innovative 
technology between the periods of 2006-2019. Next, I observed and inferred that the decision to 
make investments related to I4.0 are closely linked to the impact that investment in C.N.C.s and 
associated materials (C.N.C Bundle hereafter) in the late 1990’s. Using both interview and 
qualitative data, I describe how the C.N.C. impacted the daily mundane practices and mindset of 
management, constituents of Investa’s cultural repertoire. Findings suggest that the C.N.C. has 
had an agentic role to play in the strategic choices of the top management & influenced their 
investment heavy response to I4.0. I discuss this finding linking with the concept of materiality.  
Similarities and Differences of the two firms in Cultural Repertoire 
The examination of daily mundane practices, comprising of routines, rituals and actions, led to 
the forming of the cultural repertoire of the firms (Swidler, 1986). The applicability of this model 
both at the level of the individual and the firm allowed for comprehensive observations during 
qualitative collection. The firms, as identified during the first visit to Jamshedpur, were found to 
be similar along the various attributes of market position, end customer, organizational structure 
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and governance. Both these firms were second-generation family businesses that manufactured 
brake and engine assembly parts. Greater than three-fourths of their businesses catered to their 
primary customer in Tata Motors. The active involvement of family members in the day to day 
activities led to a structure without concrete middle management. I summarize their similarities 
in several key aspects in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Similarities between Investa and Novista 
Category	   Investa	   Novista	  
	   	   	  
Year	  founded	   1996	   1996	  
No	  of	  employees 220	   250	  
Generations	  in	  Business 2	   2	  
Customer Tata	  Motors	  (>75%)	   Tata	  Motors	  (>75%)	  
Position	  in	  Market Top	  5%	   Top	  5%	  
Style	  of	  Ownership Family	  Members	   Family	  Members	  
Quality	  Certifications ISO	  14001	   ISO	  14001	  
Other	  certifications IATF	  and	  TS	   IATF	  and	  TS	  
Joint	  Ventures/M&A 
no	  
painting	  sometimes	  by	  
undisclosed	  3rd	  party	  
0	  PPM	  goal Yes	   Yes	  
Auditing-­‐Internal Yes	   Yes	  
Auditing-­‐External	   Yes	   Yes	  








Table 2 lists notable differences that I observed: 
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Table 2: Differences between Investa and Novista 
 
 As shown in the Table 2, my analysis suggests that the primary difference between the 
two firms was that of investments related to 14.0 technologies. Investa had built a strategy 
around investing in innovative technology to achieve economies of scale, and Novista was 
focused on developing the cheapest possible product with good quality. However, both firms 
continued to be successful with contrasting approaches to the machining process. In the sub-
sections below, firstly, I discuss the aforementioned features with regards to Investa and, 
secondly, provide contrasting examples with regards to Novista below. 
 
Category Investa Novista 
Collaborative	  Robots 6 0 
Hiring	  Process Indo-­‐Danish	  Tool	  Room Staff	  Recommendation	  
 
Supply	  Chain EPR+	  Print chalk	  board	  logs,	  note	  books	  
 
Common	  area separate	  room	  in	  office	  building	   area	  close	  to	  machining	  part	  
 
Women	  in	  Workplace Yes	   No 
Management	  Communication Enterprise	  Resource	  Planning	  
system	  
Whatsapp	  +	  Weekly	  meeting	  
 
Access	  to	  Extra	  Labor No	   Yes 
C.N.C.	  machines(New) 48	   3 
Lathe	  Machines(Old) 5 56 
Early	  entry Yes No 
Probation	  period	  new	  
employees 
3 weeks 1 week 
Background	  of	  TMT Finance and Advertising Engineering and Metallurgy 
Old	  Staff	  in	  New	  Process Yes No 
More	  Pay	  in	  Automation	  Jobs	   Yes No 
Response	  to	  downturn	   Keeping Staff Laying off staff 
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Investa’s Orientation: Risk-Taking and Growth. Risk-Taking and Growth Orientation 
emerged as a central theme during the observation data collection, interview and data analysis 
phases. It was facilitated by top management identifying strongly with an approach that involved 
investing in technologies that were emergent and not adopted widely in their local environment 
yet. They implemented technology over the years not only as a unique response to environmental 
uncertainty but also because they believed that it was essential to success in the local automotive 
industry. During the semi-structured interviews with the top management at Investa, this 
characteristic stood out. Performing a simple word-count on the data transcribed, the word risk 
and associated terms such as “risk-taking”, “risk-takers “ and “risk of implementation” were, by 
far, the most frequent. The following quote from an interview illustrates such an orientation:  
 
Sometimes we take the risk of implement-implementing you know even if we are not sure 
about it. But that's the risk that you have to take in business, right, that is the reward that 
you get of taking the risk in business. So, yeah, so I think we are, we, I consider ourselves 
to be you know high risk takers, that is why the reward for us is also high. 
 
In addition to risk-taking, the mindset of top management was that of growth. Their 
response to crisis and attitude toward innovation was highlighted when, during the observation 
data collection phase, there was a downturn in the economy due to the upcoming Indian 
elections. The uncertainty surrounding the future of the country’s governmental policies led to a 
reduction in demand for new automobiles. Novista, the other firm in the study, had reduced the 
number of shifts of operations to adjust for the financial losses caused by the downturn. 
However, the management at Investa decided to use this time to install a new innovation, an 
oiling robotic arm based on the dual purpose of improving its processes and educating the 
employees about the new technology & its impact on their work practices. In fact, the installation 
of this robotic arm was turned into a day of celebration, and bonding as employees helped 
themselves to a free buffet lunch and learnt about the new machine. Discourses about the new 
innovation were handed out in the form of prints, talks with the top management and the external 
engineer responsible for installation. 
In addition, the existing machines were used in unconventional ways. The C.N.C., 
designed to tackle heavier components in manufacturing, was used for smaller components. It 
was regarded by industry informants as a mistake. However, at Investa, such a seeming mistake 
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has worked as a source of competitive advantage. The management’s confidence behind this 
counterintuitive approach is summed up well below:  
 
You will generally not find anyone you know buying even a single C.N.C. machines for 
the small components…We started investing in C.N.C.s and you know it's just changed the 
game for us, you know we could manufacture a lot lot more, a lot more than we could think 
of manufacturing in conventional machines. We could make different components, right. 
You have conventional machines, that machine, it will do a-a particular job and that's about 
it. 
 
This approach seemed to take on a philosophical role with the management. In the 
discussion about the impact of large investments on small enterprises, the director emphasized 
that the differentiating factor lay in the ability of a firm to take risk and this ability emanated 
from the thought process. The firm continued to invest in innovative technology since 
investments were equated with continued growth. It was seen by the management as the primary 
way to continue their success in the industry. The director noted:  
 
Its' just the-it's just how you think, it's, the-there is absolutely no difference, you know we 
also started with very less money, we also started with absolutely no money. It’s the, how 
much aptitude, how much hunger do you have and how much risk can you take. You know 
do you have the risk taking abilities or not? Right, that itself you know differentiates you, 
differentiates a, an actual businessman from an average businessman, right. A good 
businessman will take risks at every stages in his life, you know it's when you stop taking 
that, you become comfortable, you say, why do I have to invest or you know this much is 
enough for me, that you start going down. 
 
The trajectory of innovation of the firm from its founding in 1996 to 2019 shows that these 
instances of risk-taking were not just isolated instances but a part of the company strategy 
formulated in the philosophy of the founder and implemented in their responses to uncertainty 
over the years. This is shown in table 3. While the terminologies associated with the technologies 
are not important, it is interesting to note certain investments and the time they were made. For 
instance, the recession in 2008 had affected the global economy. Despite setbacks around that 
time and the severe downturn in the automotive industry, the management decided to implement 
C.N.C.s on a mass scale. At a time where most of its competitors were fighting for survival and 
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banks were going bankrupt, they managed to convince the banks to lend them money for this 
project. Speaking about this, the chairman noted: 
 
The investments were pretty high, we had to invest like crores of rupees in this, we had to 
convince the bank a lot as to why we are doing it. It was-it was not an easy process to 
convince them because it requires a lot of money, right? 
 
While other downturns were not as severe as the 2008 recession, 2014 was considered by 
many as a damaging time for the automotive industry due to changing laws and the upcoming 
elections. Fast forward to 2019, during the observation data collection phase, a similar downturn 
was observed. During both of these phases, as with the 2008 downturn, the firm decided to invest 
in more innovative technology. Table 3 shows a timeline of these investments. 
Table 3: Timeline of investments in innovative technology 
Computer  Numerical  Control   2006  
Mass  Implementation  of  C.N.C.   2010  
Engagement  with  Automation   2013  
Vertical  Turret  Lathe   2014  
Vertical  Machining  Centre   2014  
Engagement  with  Industry  4.0   2015  
Gantry  Systems   2016  
Collaborative  Robots   2017  
Oiling  Robotic  Arm   2019  
 
An unexpected yet interesting finding was the unconventional background of the top 
management at Investa. Originally a trader, the director lost his job in 1994 due to a split in the 
family business and embarked on the manufacturing path. From the original sample of 10 firms, 
he is the only top manager that does not have an engineering background. Lack of formal 
education, however, seemed to work in his favor as it allowed him to make bolder choices. 
Explaining this, he said: 
Common sense is a very big power. I am not an engineer, but being not an engineer I can 
understand how to work and what technology are in the market, and we participate in so 
many fairs, get information from there, and we utilize on it, and we are getting the 
benefits of that.  
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Novista’s Orientation: Caution and Quality. Novista took a more traditional approach 
to manufacturing and made incremental changes with minimal risk. The managing director, 
responding to their investment strategy, noted: 
 
We plan our strategy of investments in a very, very cautious manner.  We are not very risk-
taking or very, very flamboyant that way, so when we see that the market is okay and it has 
got some growth potential, then slowly and gradually we invest.  We do not want our 
money to get wasted, so we are very, very cautious about our investments. 
 
Limited financial resources at the disposal of the top management coupled with an 
expectation of a reasonable time for a return on their investment dictated the firm’s risk 
avoidance strategy. The chairman, responding to the risks involved with innovative technology, 
noted: 
 
No, that is not a risk, but innovative technology means a lot of money.  And we have a 
small business and more of a traditional business, so that is why we don't take much of a 
risk in terms of putting innovative technology.  We are also very cautious, and slowly and 
gradually if there is a low-cost innovation or automation, then we go about it.  Otherwise, 
it becomes very, very costly, and the return on investment is very long. 
 
Operating in a cautious manner was a strategy that had served the firm well over the 
years. In contrast to Investa’s focus on growth and innovation, Novista’s top management 
prioritized quality and just in time delivery. Speaking about the company vision, the director 
noted: 
 
In the next 3 years, we want that our company should be regarded as one of the top 3 
machining suppliers to Tata Motors in terms of quality and just-in-time delivery. 
 
 
However, the priority on quality was also due to the fact that most machines that were 
operating used manual labor and hence, were subject to errors resulting from practice. Bringing 
in innovative technology that reduced the involvement of human labor would have been an 
effective way to deal with the problem but the cautious nature of the firm with regards to 
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finances facilitated continued usage of manual machines. Top management seemed to be aware 
of the drawbacks of conventional manufacturing processes. Speaking about this, the managing 
director noted: 
 
We have limited funds with us, so we can't grow in a very big way. Had we invested in lots 
of C.N.C.s and robotics and all, we would have approached other customers but that is a 
drawback with us. Very sophisticated C.N.C.s which can give you good, good product and 
in-built qualities into the system.  So, that definitely will help, but currently we are 
managing with the setup that we have, and we are able to achieve good quality by making 
precise control, by using good manpower, by using good tooling.   
 
 
The limitation due to funds seems likely to continue into the future. During the discussion 
on future plans for innovative technology, he noted: 
 
Not really because we don't have much funds, we are quite limited that way. But, having, 
if things are good then we will invest in some more C.N.C.s, so that we can get a bigger 
volume. 
 
However, he added that this strategy was unlikely to continue past the near future since 
the abundance of workers would reduce as other avenues for would open for these people. The 
narrative around innovation revolved around the availability of cheap labor and not the direct 
manufacturing benefits that innovation brought. 
 
Time is coming that people slowly and gradually will not like to work in the 
manufacturing industry because lots of other avenues are open for them, so we will have 
to go in for some automation, maybe robotics or some automation. 
 
It is important to note here, that Novista had continued to enjoy success using their 
conventional strategy. This could be attributed to close relationships and good communication 
with its customer, Tata Motors, which allowed the firm to receive consistent orders and 




Source of the difference in cultural repertoire: Materiality of C.N.C. at Investa 
I observed that the C.N.C. played a significant agentic role in enabling and constraining strategic 
investment decisions related to I4.0 technologies. This finding is consistent with previous 
scholars’ discussion on materiality in the practice literature (Orlikowski, 2007, 2009; Orlikowski 
& Scott, 2008, 2014; Vaara & Whittington, 2012; Jarzabkowski et al, 2016). Materials, in its 
various forms, constitute a major component of many industries. In this paper, the automotive 
firms used non-human agents such as documents, technologies and displays (Varra & 
Whittington, 2012). In strategy literature, more obvious materials such as PowerPoint have been 
shown to influence strategy making (Kaplan, 2011). However, despite the prevalence of material 
artifacts in daily organizational practices, the literature on their role in strategy making is, for the 
most part, missing (Orlikowski & Scott, 2008). In this context too, for instance, the role of the 
C.N.C. was a surprising finding. 
Henceforth, I focus on the firm, Investa, and discuss the changes that resulted from the 
materiality of this particular machine. The initial installation of C.N.C. in 2006 followed by mass 
implementation in 2010 altered Investa’s supply chain practices, organizational practices and 
mindset of top management in a manner that was favorable to and aligned with investing in 
innovative technologies related to I4.0. In combination with other materials such as Enterprise 
Resource Planning and other Machines, the C.N.C formed a bundle of resources (C.N.C bundle 
hereafter) that exerted powerful agency over the organization.  
Below, I discuss the industry-wide impact of the C.N.C. bundle (field-level) since it 
paints a picture of the general responses of the firms in the global and local automotive industry 
to the complexity in the last twenty years of the twentieth century. Next, using qualitative and 
interview data, I discuss that Investa’s recent investment decisions (firm-level) can be traced 
back to the historical and continued changes in processes that resulted from the attributes of the 
C.N.C. bundle. 
 
The Industry-wide Impact of The C.N.C.  
The C.N.C. was a breakthrough technology that allowed for automation in a manufacturing 
process called machining: the primary activity that the firms in this study engaged in. In this 
industry, the lathe (traditional) machine has been used for millennia: the earliest evidence dating 
back to ancient Egypt in 1300 BC. The lathe was very important to the Industrial Revolution and 
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is referred to as the mother of all machine tools.  In the second half of the twentieth century, the 
addition of numerical control and subsequent advent of computers led to the development of the 
C.N.C. 
By the late 1980’s, it had become widely used in the developed manufacturing nations, 
However, in India, its usage was not widespread in small and medium enterprises until the 
1990’s, when favorable government policies encouraged investments in expensive technologies. 
In Jamshedpur, favorable policies for innovation contrasted with access to the cheapest power 
labor in the country meant that, some firms invested in these machines whereas others did not. 
Entrepreneurial firms, like Investa, decided to take the risk of implementing it into their 
processes whereas the majority, like Novista, chose to wait. The first instance of automation and 
computing for the machining process, these expensive machines had a role to play not only in the 
scale of operations that a firm could develop but also in the development of work practices and 
workmanship. 
This created two distinct types of firms in the industry: C.N.C. and non-C.N.C. firms. 
The reliability in quality that the C.N.C. had over the lathe machine meant that some buyers 
would not even consider working with a non C.N.C. firm. However, Tata Motors, the primary 
buyer for Investa and Novista, had a different philosophy. They emphasized quality and just-in-
time delivery and whilst the C.N.C.s facilitated those tenets, they were not deemed necessary for 
business. Firms, like Novista, that maintained high quality, continued to receive business from 
Tata Motors and did so at a lower cost compared with their C.N.C.-enabled rivals. At the time of 
the study, both Investa and Novista generated revenues that placed them in the top 5% of the 
machining industry in Jamshedpur. They made similar products for the same customer, despite 
their contrasting decisions with respect to their investments. Despite their many similarities, 
there were significant differences in the manner in which Investa and Novista went about their 
business practices. The following sub-sections provide a combination of data from the interviews 
and qualitative observations to show that the recent investment decisions are tightly linked to the 
work processes and the mindset that have been developed by the firm and its actors since the 
initial implementation of the machine, over a decade ago. 
 
Impact on supply chain practices and subsequent investment decisions. The 
implementation of C.N.C.s required a sizeable change in the supply chain practices. The 
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traditional model of using logs and note-books to keep track of work processes was replaced by 
an Enterprise-Resource-Planning system. The new system kept track of the large volumes of data 
that the machine generated using an online system. The partial automation of the machining 
process meant that workers did not have to spend all their time loading and unloading heavy 
components. They could instead focus on making sure that the process that they were 
individually responsible for was working efficiently. Subsequent investments in more machines 
until “mass implementation” by 2010 were laden with risk, especially with the global recession 
in 2008. Table 4 shows the changes made to supply chain practices from the traditional model of 
manufacturing to the more recent one, triggered by the implementation of the C.N.C. bundle. 
 
 
Table 4: Changes to the supply chain practices due to the implementation of the C.N.C. bundle 
 
In the years that followed, more machines and innovations were added, shown in Table 3. 
These innovations allowed the firm to continue to develop its supply chain practices and made 
Table 4 Before Implementation Post Implementation 
Planning Order requests from customer were printed out 
and distributed to the supervisors on paper 
Orders were directly placed by 
the customer on the online 
systems 
Information Stored in logs and note-books and usually kept 
on tables next to the individual process. The 
supervisors were responsible for keeping them 
updated. 
The machine generated and kept 
track of the work it had done 
and the data was easily 
accessible, online or by print. 
Inventory Components were left in a surrounding shed 
and were counted as and when needed. 
Information was available on the 
ERP system 
Production Quality was impacted by human error and 
quantity depended on the efficiency of the 
workforce 
Quality and Quantity both 
increased since the machine 
could operate for a full 24 hours. 
Return of Goods The item number was used to decode the day 
of manufacturing, but no additional data was 
available. 
Scanning the barcode on the 
returned item could trace the 
exact time of work and person 
responsible for it. 
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the C.N.C. bundle a more dominant player. The investment heavy engagement with I4.0 started 
in 2016 with the installations of Gantry Systems: robotic installations that could operate on a 
horizontal plane and be used to move components between C.N.C.s. Collaborative robots, or 
“cobots”, were brought in 2017 to facilitate 3-dimensional movement. These worked alongside 
the human workforce and automated some of the more mundane practices such as loading and 
unloading components. The combination of Gantry Systems and Cobots meant that the machine 
could operate with reduced dependence on the operator and this was a stepping stone towards 
I4.0. Speaking about this, the managing director noted: 
We have also put gantry systems, we've put two gantry systems you know each gantry 
system is on top of three C.N.C.s, so six C.N.C.s are taken care like that. Plus we have two 
robots that take care of four machines. So we have done a lot of automation. 
 
Impact on Organizational Practices. The implementation of the C.N.C. bundle brought 
about some interesting changes to the organizational practices. These changes complimented the 
modified supply chain practices and created an environment where I4.0 investments could be 
rationalized. The workplace no longer needed strong workers to load and unload heavy parts and 
instead became an ecosystem of inclusivity and learning. I provide more detailed discussions 
below: 
  
More inclusivity in the workforce. The automation of lifting and loading heavy 
equipment by the C.N.C. bundle allowed for more inclusivity in the workforce. Traditionally 
seen as a workplace for men, due to the heavy weighted products involved, the automotive 
industry lacked women workers in large parts of the shop floor. Tasks such as cleaning, 
transporting sand and cement and other supporting roles were the norm for women workers and 
still are, in a large number of firms. A combination of the attributes of the C.N.C. bundle and 
conscious effort on the part of management to include more women led to more inclusivity and a 
larger pool of workers to choose from. Speaking about this, the director noted: 
 
I saw that we didn't have any women workforce in our company, right and I said, why can't 
women work in my company? They don’t have to lift a lot. Right, So, I can easily have a 
good women workforce you know in the company.  
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Upskilling the current workforce. Training programs were also offered to the existing 
workforce and everyone was given an equal opportunity to learn about the technologies that were 
implemented. It was important to “upskill” the workforce since the technologies related to I4.0 
would require and advanced understanding of computers and associated technologies. Their 
previous task of loading and unloading the components onto the machine was replaced by 
automation. In the time between the first C.N.C. (2006) and the time this study was conducted 
(2019), the staff had learnt how to use computers and related systems and gradually become 
more equipped to handle complex internet-based programs that were needed for the more 
advanced robotic-based functions. By learning about these systems, they also moved into the 
class of skilled workers and hence, increased their salaries over time. The members of the staff 
that were uninterested or lacked the cognitive capacity to learn continued to work with the 
partially defunct processes involving manual operations. Speaking about the changing role of the 
workforce, the chairman noted: 
 
We have got a people, we don’t want to make unemployment, we want to make them 
important in other work, because for the tending operation we were using so many laborers. 
So, we want to put them in quality, in other systems, so they can use their ability as human 
being, not as a tending operation. 
 
 
 Attracting a younger, more educated workforce. The innovative technologies attracted a 
younger workforce to the firm since the opportunity to work with robots and advanced computer 
systems was lucrative to the educated youth. Firms with traditional practices found it difficult to 
them since manual operations were classified as unskilled and paid a lower wage than skilled 
labor. Speaking about this, the director noted: 
 
Yeah, yeah there is a minimum wage you know which is decided by the state government 
and you know so there are minimum wages for unskilled laborers, semi-skilled laborers, 
and skilled laborers.  
 
The costs associated with investing in the machines and secondly, paying the skilled 
workforce increased the overhead costs of Investa a lot but top management seemed certain that 
the trade-offs would pay off, since the advanced manufacturing technologies related to I 4.0 
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would require a skilled workforce that was capable of handling them. Building internal 
capabilities was important to maximize the potential of the new technologies and internal 
training programs were used to accelerate the learning process. Speaking about recruitment and 
training, the manager noted: 
 
I generally recruit from IDTR which is Indo Danish Tool Room, which is a central 
government's college. You know we work with hydraulic fixtures, we don't work in man-
manual fixtures, we have Cobots, we have robots. So, if you don't have the basic sense 
then you might not be able to fit in my company, right. So, what we do is, we really train 
our people, we are involved ourselves and I have a training program you know that I run 
for all of these people.  
 
Mindset of Top Management. The distinct separation of the facilities that used manual 
machines from those that used the C.N.C. bundle was a clear indication from the management 
that the two styles of manufacturing would not be used interchangeably. During the initial 
investments in 2006, the C.N.C. was placed and operated under the same roof as the manual 
lathe machines. Once mass implementation was complete in 2010, the manufacturing set-up was 
divided into Zone 1 and Zone 2. Zone 1 continued to operate in the traditional ways and utilized 
workers that either did not enjoy the innovations or were deemed incapable of learning. Zone 2 
had the innovative machines and members of the workforce that were interested learnt about this 
new style of manufacturing. From 2010 to 2019, the percentage of business conducted in the 
traditional way slowly decreased and at the time of observation data collection, less than 10% of 
the overall volume was manufactured using manual machines. At the time of the study, the firm 
had 4 Zones and Zone 4 contained the latest investments in technologies related to I 4.0. It 
seemed clear that the management wanted to separate the two styles of manufacturing and that 
any new investments would be along the lines of the new processes related to advanced C.N.C. 
Machining and the concept of I4.0. The director, speaking about the impact the machine has had 
on their success, said: 
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C.N.C. has changed the game for us. We have bought 6 cobots that work with our existing 
manpower. We are market leaders because we invested in C.N.C.s. 
 
Secondly, the top management had little option but to stick with their decision of working 
with the C.N.C.s. These machines were financed by the local banks who wanted to see continued 
growth. A move back to the manual operations was not financially feasible since the lenders had 
the ability to seize their investments if the profitability showed signs of weakness.  
A key way to improve the efficiency and resulting profitability was to continue to add 
incremental technologies to the existing set-up, which they did using the gantry systems and 




The aim of this research was to understand why similar firms make contrasting investment 
decisions when faced with a new institutional logic. Findings suggest that the primary difference 
between the two firms, in similar field positioning and structural arrangements, is a particular 
material artifact, the C.N.C. These machines, in combination with the other materials that 
enhanced and constrained its attributes, exerted a powerful agentic role over firm Investa. Figure 
5 displays an empirically grounded theoretical model that shows the impact that the materiality 
of a particular response, the implementation of C.N.C. bundle, had and continues to have on 
Investa.  
 
The Centrality of the C.N.C. Bundle’s Materiality at Investa 
The centrality of the C.N.C. bundle in the cultural repertoire of Investa was evident during 
several instances of data collection and analysis. During cross-comparison of the cultural 
repertoire of the two firms, it became clear that the primary differentiator between the firms was 
the C.N.C. bundle. Figure 5 shows the agentic role of the C.N.C. bundle and associated 
technologies in affecting the supply chain and organizational practices of Investa. While 
previous literature has discussed the impact on mindset on strategy-making, this paper adds to 
those learnings. The following sections showcase that Investa’s response to the emerging 
complexity of I4.0 is a manifestation of not only the mindset of the top management but also the 
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impact of the materiality of the C.N.C. bundle on the organizational & supply chain practices and 



















Impact of Mindset on C.N.C. Investment. There was a strong sense of technological 
leadership amongst the top management and the workforce. This mindset with regards to 
innovative technology was a major contributing factor in the investments in C.N.C Machine in 
2006. The cognitive reasons that facilitate such decision-making has been studied in depth in 
micro-institutional literature (Schilke, 2018).  
Impact of Mindset on Practices. Over the next decade, many of Investa’s competitors 
started discussions on possibly investing in C.N.C. By this time, however, the top management at 
Investa had developed sophisticated supply chain & organizational practices and a workforce 
that was capable of handling them. As discussed in the Findings section, there was an element of 
intra-firm intentional work by the top management that allowed for the attributes of the machines 
to be used effectively.  
Mindset of Top 
Management C.N.C. Bundle 
Organisational and 
Supply Chain Practices 
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Agentic Role of C.N.C. Bundle In addition to the mindset of the top management, the 
C.N.C. bundle itself had an agentic role to play in transforming the organizational and supply 
chain practices, denoted by the dotted line. It is interesting that even though the decision to 
implement C.N.C., back in 2006, is attributed to the mindset of the top management team, the 
transformations in the processes were influenced by both human cognition and the materiality of 
the machine. The top management could use the attributes of the C.N.C. bundle to enhance their 
operations but were also bound by those same attributes. Heavy capital investments and a supply 
chain that was built around the machine meant that they could not revert back to traditional 
processes in a profitable manner. As they invested in more advanced technologies that worked in 
unison with the C.N.C., the centrality of the C.N.C bundle grew even further. In fact, almost 
every investment in innovative technology after the C.N.C., shown previously in Table 3, was 
made to further the attributes of the C.N.C. itself. Even at the time of the study, 13 years after its 
initial implementation, the machine continues to be an agent of change. Its most recent impact is 
the heavy investments in I4.0 technologies. 
Reverse Impact of Practices on Mindset. The implementation of these technologies and 
development of resulting practices were a resource consuming process and over time, had their 
own impact on the mindset of the top management, from which they first arose. Top 
management attributed their ‘game-changing’ approach using a risk-taking and growth oriented 
strategy to the success that resulted from the C.N.C. Engaging in I4.0 technologies, then, became 
the continued response of the firm to tackle uncertainty with innovation.  
 
The Social Context of Materiality 
It is important to consider the social context in which the C.N.C. bundle exercised its agency. 
Firms in Jamshedpur had always operated using traditional, lathe machines and their simplicity 
of use meant that the workforce did not have to have formal education or a working knowledge 
of computers. This factor, in addition to the large capital needed, discouraged managers from 
investing in C.N.C. It was simpler to continue making steady income using traditional machines 
and utilize the abundance of cheap, unskilled labor. The industry provided jobs to a significant 
portion of the city’s population and concerns related to unemployment resulting from automating 
supply chains further dissuaded managers from investing in innovative technology. This is where 
the changes made by Investa provide interesting insights into the company’s unique approach. 
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Despite the advantages associated with holding onto traditional practices, the management at 
Investa saw an opportunity to achieve economies of scale by utilizing machines not at the 
expense of the current workforce but in a supporting role. The emphasis on ‘upskilling’ their 
employees created an environment of learning and over time, they became well-versed with 
computers and associated technologies. This environment was also attractive to fresh graduates 
since the opportunity to work with innovative technologies was exciting and reduced the 
physical exertion that was customary with traditional manufacturing practices. Hence, intra-firm 
intentional work on the part of the top management is an added element of agency that promoted 
the attributes of the machine and future research may examine the magnitude of this promotion.  
 
Theoretical Contributions 
The primary contribution of this model of the centrality of materiality is a complementary 
understanding to the micro-institutional research on identity (aspirations, values, beliefs and 
mindset) that explains the varied responses of firms to environmental complexity. While those 
attributes are important and influence strategic decisions, they are incomplete without an 
examination of the role of materiality. This research is in its nascent stages and may be combined 
with other theoretical perspectives in order to understand its impact. In this paper, I make an 
attempt at this and suggest that both the cognitive and material aspects of humans and machines 
must be considered in conjunction to develop a more sophisticated understanding of the 
entanglement of the social and the material (Orlikowski, 2005).  
This paper furthers this understanding of materiality by suggesting that the introduction 
of C.N.C. bundle to the firm, comprising of identity, technologies and practices, modified it into 
a different entity altogether. This allowed the new entity to “acquire form, attributes and 
capabilities through their interpenetration” (Orlikowski & Scott, 2008, pg 455-456). While this 
finding serves to emphasize the importance of considering materiality in strategy literature, it 
also provides a novel differentiator between firms that have similar positioning and structure. It 
is no longer satisfactory to look at the resources a firm has as valuable, rare and inimitable 
(Barney, 1991) and research may consider that the repertoire a firm has at its disposal consists of 
identity, technologies and practices. This could be combined with entrepreneurship literature on 
bricolage and necessity entrepreneurship (Baker & Nelson, 2005). 
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 Research on family firms will benefit from this model since family-owned firms place a 
greater emphasis on the cognitive aspects of top management. The lack of stable middle 
management in many of these firms leads to a majority of decisions being made by the owners, 
who also function as the top management team. The sample of firms in this study was especially 
unique due to their various similarities and researchers may keep an eye out for such interesting 
empirical settings since they provide a rich context for detailed qualitative work. Literature in 
practice theories benefits from this model since the repertoire of the firms may not just consist of 
the daily routines and practices of the members but also be affected by the attributes of the 
material artifacts.  
 
Managerial Contributions 
Materiality can be a unique way to achieve competitive advantage, especially in industries where 
similar technologies are adopted by a majority of firms. Understanding the attributes of a 
material and aligning work processes that maximize its utility will be crucial for managers, 
especially in industries like manufacturing. Doing so would not only help them maximize their 
return on investment but also improve their work processes and the skillset of their employees. It 
is not my intention to promote the idea that usage of innovative materials during times of 
uncertainty is a better response. There is more than one response that can lead to continued 
success as we see with both Investa and Novista, who committed to their own strategies and 
were successful over a period of time. It is convenient to invest in the latest technologies and 
build a business plan that uses innovation as a differentiator but there are learnings to be made 
from Novista’s approach. They continue to provide employment for all their staff and do so in a 
profitable manner.  
 
Limitations and Future Research 
The major limitation of this study was the lack of concrete data on both firms’ financial 
performance. Since these firms were privately owned and decided not to share their financial 
information, it was not certain whether Novista was indeed suffering from a lack of financial 
resources. While both firms occupied the top 5% market position, it is plausible that they had 
contrasting positions with regards to financial capital. The Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Cyert 
& March, 1963) could, in such a case, provide an alternate explanation on the reasons behind the 
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divergent decision making of the firms with regards to I4.0. A cornerstone of this theory is the 
concept of aspiration levels (Gavetti et. al, 2012) and one alternate explanation could be that 
Firm Investa had higher aspiration levels and hence searched for solutions, using innovative 
technology as a means to achieve it. The management at the firm were, in contrast Firm Investa, 
trained in finance and advertising and might have found it easier to look past traditional 
organizational processes. In alignment with their attributes of risk-taking and growth, they found 
it easier to invest in C.N.C and associated technologies, leading to the formation of the C.N.C 
Bundle. Firm Novista’s management comprised of engineers and metallurgists and were, 
accordingly, more deeply entrenched in traditional manufacturing processes, by virtue of their 
education and past experience. Hence, they might have been hesitant to look past the 
organizational practices that served them well and reinforced their orientation of caution and 
quality. Behavioral Theory could also be combined with prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979) to explain variation in firm risk-taking (Argote & Greve, 2007; Bromiley, 1991). 
Both firms could have had different reference-points and hence chose to make strategic decisions 
in contrasting ways. Perhaps, despite their success, managers at Firm Investa felt that they lay 
below their reference points for growth. This, in combination with their aspiration levels, may 
have been a contributing factor to their positive engagement with I4.0.  
This paper adds to the techno-centric literature that examines the agentic role that 
materials play, (Orlikowski, 2005) but the relationship of the material and social is more 
complex than that. Future research needs to look at, in greater depth than this study, the reverse-
impact that humans have on materials and examine the constitutive entanglement of the social 
and material. It is plausible that, depending on the organization and its materials, the impact 
could be either techno-centric or human-centric. Hence, privileging the technology or the actor 
would depend on the specific context. In the firms studied in this paper, the agentic role of the 
machine was telling and the lens chosen was appropriately, techno-centric. This does not imply, 
however, that the workforce did not have an impact on the materiality and future research can 
build on the model above. The idea of intra-firm intentional work, mentioned briefly in the 
discussion, may be studied by future scholars to further piece-out the impact that the top 
management can have on the overall effect that a material may have on the firm. A second 
limitation of this paper is the size of the sample of firms chosen to be studied. The initial sample 
of ten firms is not substantial and, in an ideal case, a larger sample of firms needs to be 
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incorporated to make more informed calculations about industry-wide decisions. The second 
sample of two firms worked out well to provide contrast and interesting findings and selecting 
some firms with more investment than Novista and less investment than Investa may lead to 
further interesting research. Materiality needs to be studied in a variety of combinations and 
cross-comparative case analysis provides a useful starting point.  
My analysis reveals that materiality is central to organizations. Research on materiality is 
not, however, central to organizational research. Future research, especially, in the case of small 
and medium enterprises, where the role of a material can be significant, needs to pay greater 
attention to their attributes and, resulting, materiality. A second direction that future researchers 
could take is examining the impact that the CNC Material had on the practices of a firm over 
time and if the changes made were gradual or forced by changes in the local and global 
economy. A third, unexplored, way to study materiality is to understand its role as an agent of 
social change. At Investa, the C.N.C. material facilitated education of the employees and an 
increase in their salaries and standards of living. In developing nations, where many people are 
not able to either afford or access higher education, machines can play a critical role in creating 
an environment of in-situ learning. There is a promising space where research could be carried 
out. Lastly, materials such as software used for virtual collaboration, augmented reality and other 
non-physical need to be studied to understand the role that their increasing presence will have on 
an organizations and its workforce. The field of materiality is now no longer new but research 
has been sporadic and non-incremental. Herein lies an opportunity for management scholars to 





Julius Caesar, before crossing the tiny Rubicon River in 49 B.C.E, said “anerriphtho kybos!" or 
"let the die be cast" in Greek. To “Cross the Rubicon” is a metaphor referring to that quote and 
means to take a step that is irrevocable and commits one in a specific direction. We may have 
crossed the Rubicon with our commitment to using innovative materials, both physical and non-
physical. The advances and rapid onset of material technologies that operate on artificial 
intelligence might increase the impact that materials, bolstered by a cognition of their own, will 
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have on humans and organizations. Research needs to be proactive in examining and explaining 
the current and potential impacts this will have on organizations so that managers can be more 
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Day by Day Schedule 
 
Strategy Related Questions- Day 1 
(90 mins) 
 
•   What	  do	  you	  think	  is	  important	  to	  success	  in	  the	  automobile	  industry?	  
•   How	  would	  you	  define	  your	  company’s	  strategy	  related	  to	  investing	  in	  the	  future?	  
•   What	  does	  Industry	  4.0	  mean	  to	  you?	  How	  did	  you	  learn	  about	  this?	  
•   Do	  you	  think	  you	  have	  access	  to	  enough	  information	  in	  order	  to	  make	  informed	  investment	  
decisions?	  
•   How	  confident	  do	  you	  feel	  about	  your	  investment	  decisions?	  
•   As	  a	  company,	  how	  are	  you	  different	  from	  others?	  
•   How,	  it	  at	  all,	  has	  your	  company	  strategy	  changed	  over	  the	  years?	  	  
•   Do	  you	  see	  Industry	  4.0	  as	  an	  opportunity	  for	  firms	  in	  Jamshedpur	  to	  compete	  with	  the	  global	  
market?	  
•   Did	  any	  recent	  investment	  fail	  to	  impress	  you	  with	  its	  working?	  Has	  this	  discouraged	  you	  from	  
further	  investing	  in	  similar	  technology?	  
•   Do	  you	  have	  a	  company	  vision	  and	  mission?	  
•   What	  changes	  would	  you	  recommend	  to	  your	  company’s	  strategy?	  Why?	  	  
 
Background- Day 2 
(60+30 mins) 
 
A)   Firm	  level	  
•   When	  was	  the	  firm	  created?	  Who	  started	  it?	  (year,	  Employees,	  investment)	  
•   What	  was	  the	  motivation	  behind	  the	  starting	  of	  the	  firm?	  
•   Did	  you	  receive	  any	  mentorship	  during	  the	  early	  years?	  What	  sources	  of	  learning	  did	  you	  have?	  
•   What	  was	  your	  knowledge	  about	  the	  machining	  process	  before	  entering	  the	  industry?	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•   What	  was	  your	  vision	  and	  mission	  at	  the	  time?	  
•   Did	  you	  have	  a	  similar	  company	  culture	  to	  what	  you	  have	  now?	  
•   How	  did	  you	  differentiate	  yourself	  from	  the	  competition	  then?	  
 
B)   Founder	  level	  
•   Please	  tell	  me	  something	  about	  yourself	  
•   What	  are	  your	  core	  beliefs	  about	  the	  way	  in	  which	  business	  should	  be	  conducted?	  
•   Do	  you	  have	  established	  routines	  in	  your	  daily	  life?	  
•   Why	  did	  you	  start	  the	  company?	  	  




Economic /Market Performance- Day 3 
(60 mins) 
 
•   How	  you	  see	  yourself	  positioned	  in	  the	  local,	  national	  and	  international	  market?	  
•   Does	  your	  geographical	  location	  assist	  you?	  
•   In	  the	  recent	  years,	  have	  there	  been	  times	  when	  the	  wider	  economy	  has	  impacted	  your	  
performance?	  
•   Which	  subsection	  of	  your	  business	  is	  the	  most	  profitable?	  Is	  investing	  in	  new	  technology	  going	  
to	  make	  other	  sections	  more	  profitable?	  
•   Are	  you	  outperforming	  your	  competitors	  post	  investment?	  
•   Have	  your	  KPI’s	  changed	  since	  investment?	  What	  impact	  do	  you	  think	  this	  will	  have?	  
 
Investment Related- Day 3(part 2) 
 
•   What	  technologies	  have	  you	  invested	  in	  recently?	  
•   Do	  you	  have	  plans	  to	  invest	  in	  further	  technology	  in	  the	  upcoming	  times?	  How	  do	  you	  learn	  
about	  these	  upcoming	  innovations?	  
•   What	  does	  the	  process	  of	  learning	  look	  like?	  Do	  you	  have	  colleagues	  you	  rely	  on	  or	  do	  you	  
research	  on	  this	  yourself?	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•   How	  do	  you	  think	  investing	  in	  CNC’s	  has	  separated	  you	  from	  those	  that	  didn’t?	  
•   Why	  do	  you	  think	  that	  some	  firms	  invested	  and	  some	  didn’t?	  
 
 
Political Related- Day 4(Part 1) 
 
•   Does	  the	  government	  impact	  your	  decision	  making	  process?	  
•   Has	  the	  government	  change	  helped	  or	  hindered?	  
•   How	  will	  the	  future	  changes	  impact	  your	  current	  investments?	  
•   Do	  you	  think	  that	  there	  is	  enough	  incentive	  from	  the	  government	  to	  move	  towards	  more	  
innovative	  technology?	  
•   Are	  there	  any	  political	  hurdles	  you	  face	  when	  conducting	  your	  work?	  
•   What	  about	  within	  your	  work	  force?	  Is	  that	  impacted	  by	  the	  government?	  
•   Is	  there	  a	  minimum	  wage	  for	  workers	  here?	  	  Has	  it	  changed	  recently?	  Do	  you	  foresee	  any	  further	  
change?	  
•   How	  important	  is	  labor	  to	  your	  functioning?	  Do	  you	  see	  a	  time	  in	  the	  near	  future	  when	  you	  can	  
reduce	  the	  manpower	  efficiently?	  
 
Social Related- Day 4(Part 2) 
 
•   How	  many	  family	  members	  are	  involved	  in	  this	  business?	  
•   Are	  there	  any	  pressures	  you	  face	  from	  the	  people	  around	  you?	  
•   Are	  you	  careful	  about	  your	  investments	  due	  to	  people	  and	  what	  they	  think?	  
•   Do	  you	  have	  close	  relationships	  with	  your	  competitors?	  
•   What	  about	  the	  customers?	  How	  do	  they	  impact	  your	  investment	  decisions?	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